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Constructing the ‘immigrant’: Germany’s radical left in the ‘refugee crisis’:  
  
The article scrutinises how Germany’s non-political party radical left has discussed immigration and 
‘cultural’ or ‘national’ identity in the context of past and current immigration into Germany, with a 
focus on the refugee crisis of 2015. Three types of radical left discourse are identified. First, some in 
this radical left have come to regard immigrants, in particular refugees, as an ‘ersatz proletariat’ and 
therefore as potential revolutionary instrument for their own project. Second, some agree that revo-
lutionary change is necessary but subordinate their principles to practical support of immigrants and 
refugees in the here and now. Third, given the improbability of communist revolution and the crisis 
of ‘Western modernity’, some in the radical left have called for the defence of ‘the West’ and to help 
immigrants assimilate into Western civilisation to emancipate themselves from their oppressive com-
munitarian identity. 
The article makes a timely contribution to the knowledge about contemporary radical left politics in 
Germany and shows the fractured nature of Germany’s non-political party radical left in the context 
of the refugee crisis. It also investigates the impact of ‘crisis’ as an ‘open moment’ and ‘catalyst’ on 
the radical left’s discourse-as-practice.  
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Introduction  
Not only since the extraordinary rise in the number of people seeking refuge in Germany from poverty 
and war – beginning in 2013 with an increase to 127.023 refugees1 and growing to a peak of 1.1 
million in 20152 – have immigration and related topics such as asylum policy, integration policy, and 
national or cultural identity been controversial in Germany. However, it is the so-called refugee crisis 
which, since 2013, has left a lasting mark on German politics, and politicised immigration and related 
topics to a degree not seen since the surge in refugee numbers during the Balkan wars in the early 
1990s.  
The refugee crisis brought to the fore, in an intense and often acrimonious public debate, difficult 
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questions on how much immigration and of what kind is possible and desirable, about the impact of 
immigration on economy, security, welfare state, nation and identity, and about what kind of policies 
could be adopted to ‘manage’ immigration. There are too many voices and discursive strands to be 
even listed here. Therefore, the article shines a light on only one specific set of contributors to this 
debate, one which has been peripheral in this debate and has attracted no attention from academic 
scholars: Germany’s non-political party radical left.  
What are, given this focus, the objectives of this article? The article presents an analysis of the 
discourse of Germany’s non-political party radical left with a temporal focus on the moment when it 
was confronted with the refugee crisis whilst entering its third decade of continuous decline – if 
waning membership, increasingly ‘reactive activism’, and diminishing public visibility are indicators  
for a downward trajectory. 3 This analysis is motivated by the understanding of crises, generally, as 
‘open moments’4 and as catalysts for change. Therefore, the theoretical expectation underpinning this 
analysis is that the refugee crisis has tested the non-political party radical left’s ways of thinking, 
speaking and acting on topics of high significance to its own political identity – capitalism, racism, 
imperialism, national or cultural identity, and the liberal (nation) state and its sovereignty as expressed 
in border, citizenship and identity regimes.5 Based on this expectation and narrowing the analytical 
focus, the article asks whether and, if so, how immigration generally and immigration in the form of 
the refugee crisis of 2015 specifically have impacted on the German non-political party radical left’s 
discourse on immigration and identity. This analysis is guided by an understanding of ‘discourse-as-
social-practice’, discussed later. 
These objectives also address a gap in knowledge. The article analyses a set of political actors not 
usually awarded much interest by the academic community, in particular at a time when much 
attention is on political mobilisations on the far-right. However, to fully understand the impact of the 
current politicisation of immigration and identity on public debate and policy, the political spectrum 
ought to be analysed in its entirety – and the article does its share to address this necessity.  
The article also wishes to encourage further research in this area. While it discusses only Germany’s 
non-political party radical left, similar actors can be found throughout Europe. These are often 
connected in transnational networks. The article therefore invites other researchers to direct attention 
to the non-political party radical left elsewhere and to think about comparative research.  
Description and analysis presented here are based on published texts only. The material consists of 
radical left groups’ websites, blog posts, flyers, magazines – i.e. sources published in the non-polit ical 
party radical left’s ‘counter public’.6 Most of the material is in German – the original quotations can 
be found as supplementary material online. The search for relevant documents was led by the prior 
identification of non-party political radical left actors. This process was guided by the public self-
identification of such actors and, more importantly, by the application of the definition, discussed 
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below, of what is meant by ‘non-political party radical left’. Texts were identified as relevant via key 
terms such as the German-language equivalents of ‘refugee crisis’, ‘refugee’, or ‘immigrant’ and via 
whole phrases signalling the discussion of national borders, national or cultural identity, the role of 
the state in immigration regulation, or the political objectives of radical left groups in relation to the 
refugee crisis. In line with the temporal focus of the article, most texts stem from the period between 
2013 and 2016, but some texts date back to the 1990s and 2000s to explain the genesis of particular 
discourses. The text corpus was read and re-read closely with the aim of identifying patterns which 
would lead to the establishment of discourse types.  
No primary data was generated for this paper. A survey would have been impossible to distribute to 
relevant respondents, while interviewees would have been difficult to identify and contact given, for 
example, the fluid nature of ‘memberships’ in relevant groups, the reluctance of members of the 
radical left to engage with outsider researchers, and given that texts are often published under 
pseudonyms or anonymously. However, for future research undertakings interviews would add to the 
understanding of how and why different actors in the non-political party radical left conceptualise 
issues around migration and act upon these. The article does not consider written sources such as grey 
literature which is often only available for short periods in the physical locations of the counter public, 
i.e. in the many ‘Infoläden’ or alternative libraries, cafés, independent youth centres or squatted 
houses where the radical left lives, organises, meets and discusses. Furthermore, minutes from 
meetings and other types of internal documents were not available for this research and are unlikely 
to be in the public domain soon, given their nature and the time-lag between production of such 
documents and their (often unlikely) appearance in publicly accessible archives.   
The texts chosen were analysed as discourse in the sense of ‘social practice. This implies a dialectical 
relationship between a particular discursive event and all the diverse elements of the situation(s), 
institutions(s), and the social structures(s) which frame it’.7 Such a dialectical relationship means that 
discourse is ‘socially constitutive as well as socially shaped: it constitutes situations, objects of 
knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people’.8 In 
the context of this article, such an understanding of discourse underlines that the refugee crisis can be 
expected to have influenced the discourse of the non-political party radical left on immigration and 
identity. Similarly, the non-political party radical left’s ‘own’ internal crisis can be expected to have 
influenced its relationships with other social actors, including refugees and immigrants. This view of 
discourse, taken from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), chimes with the understanding of ‘crisis’ 
as an open moment and as a catalyst for change, including a change in discourse.  
Approaching the matter through CDA also underlines that the constitution of ‘the refugee’ or ‘the 
immigrant’ is likely to differ as it depends on the political identities and associated objectives of the 
‘discourse producers’. These differences can be significant for object of the discourse. After all, the 
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constitution of an immigrant as a ‘threat to security’, ‘revolutionary agent’ or as an ‘enrichment of 
society’ can have severe consequences for the immigrant, depending e.g. on their relationship to the 
discourse producer and their power and interests: ‘Thus, discursive practices may have major 
ideological effects, [..] they can help to produce and reproduce unequal power relations […] through 
the ways they represent things and position people’.9 The analysis of such discursive practices 
therefore can demonstrate how discourse can generate or deepen inequalities or injustices and 
influence hierarchies. It can thus redeem the emancipatory promise10 which sets CDA apart from 
other approaches to discourse analysis and lends it its particular appeal for those who understand the 
social sciences as tasked with producing ‘critical knowledge’ and not just description and 
explanation.11  
In short, the analysis presented here is informed by CDA’s understanding of discourse-as-social-
practice because it allows an appreciation of the importance of discourse as constitutive of the social 
world and its power asymmetries, and because it allows taking into account the impact of crisis on 
discourse. As CDA is not a ‘method’ but rather a state of mind to critically understand how language 
and social structures are interrelated12, the methods of identification and analysis of the text corpus 
described earlier were chosen to match the analytical challenge of identifying different ‘discourse 
types’.13  
The remainder of the article develops as follows: After a definition of ‘non-political party radical 
left’, the three discourse types will be analysed, supported by an as-rich-as-possible reproduction of 
texts translated from German into English by the author. A conclusion will round off the article.  
 
What and who is the ‘non-political party radical left’? A definition.  
There is disagreement when it comes to the analytical terminology for political organisations and 
ideologies beyond what could be considered the political mainstream. Are adjectives such as ‘radical’, 
‘extreme’, ‘extremist’ or ‘far left/right’ appropriate when we talk about political forces and ideas 
outwith this supposed mainstream? Certainly, these terms, their usage and their meaning are 
dependent on context. They can also, it seems, be normatively laden and politicised. In West Germany, 
the domestic intelligence service used the term ‘radical’ until the mid-1970s to describe opponents of 
German parliamentary democracy both from the left and the right. Today Germany’s intelligence 
service uses the noun ‘extremism’ to describe those wishing to abolish the current political order, 
while those voicing ‘only’ fundamental criticism of this order are labelled ‘radical’14 regardless of 
their right-wing or left-wing provenance.  
Within the academic debate on the usefulness of this terminology, some propose that the term 
‘extremism’ can be applied to both left and right political thought. However, the proponents of this 
‘extremism theory’15 are criticised for reducing the difference between Nazism and communism to 
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mere nuance and for denouncing any criticism of capitalism and liberal democracy as ‘dangerous’.16 
Others use terms such as ‘radicalism’ and ‘extremism’ almost interchangeably. For example, Max 
Kaase applies the term ‘radical’ to explain ‘left extremism’ to denote a radical-democratic, egalitarian 
understanding of politics.17 Following similar reasoning but making a firm choice of terminology, 
Willibald Holzer proposes restricting usage of the term ‘radical’ to those political forces rooted in 
Enlightenment thinking18, thus excluding the far right.  
Those focussing on the study of political parties seem to prefer the use of ‘radical’ over ‘extreme’ 
when discussing parties on the left part of the political spectrum. However, it is contested which 
characteristics – origin, policy, or ideology – should be used to classify a political party as belonging 
to the ‘radical left’. There is also debate over which sub-classifications are meaningful under the 
broader category of ‘radical left party’.19 If policy and ideology are chosen as classificatory 
characteristics, then radical left parties are defined as those which reject the ‘socio-economic structure 
of contemporary capitalism and its values and practices. […] They advocate alternative economic and 
power structures involving a major redistribution of resources’.20 However, radical left parties often 
pursue a ‘situational’ radicalism that is falling short of the full anti-capitalism which non-polit ical 
party actors endorse. Nonetheless, they still articulate issues that are radical in the party’s national 
situation. 21  
The literature on political thought and on left political parties, briefly discussed above, has informed 
the definition of ‘non-political party radical left’ applied in this article. First, the term ‘radical’ is 
preferred over that of ‘extreme’ as ‘radical’. With its etymological origin in the Latin for ‘relating to 
the roots’, it aptly emphasises the stark and revolutionary extent of the departure from the status quo 
which underlies ideas and action of those in the ‘radical left’.22 Second, while the discussion presented 
here focusses exclusively on non-political party actors, they share the defining ideological objectives 
– but not the means to obtain them – with radical left parties. That means that for the purposes of this 
article – i.e. the identification of actors and relevant texts for analysis – the ‘non-political party radical 
left’ was defined as follows: all non-political party forces that seek to fundamentally change essential 
elements of the current capitalist and liberal-parliamentarian democratic system towards a radical 
democracy and egalitarian societal relations which extend into all spheres of life, under guidance of 
the broad tradition of socialism, anarchism or Marxism.   A warning is in place: a definition such as 
this can give the false impression that an empirical phenomenon is clear-cut and easily distinguisha ble 
from the next. In the context of this article, the emphasis on a ‘radical left’ located exclusively outside 
the electoral arena could suggest that there are firm boundaries between radical left actors outside 
electoral politics and those organised in party-political form. That such firm boundaries do not always 
and necessarily exist is demonstrated by political groups within the now long ‘institutionalised’23 
German party ‘Die Linke’. Associations such as the ‘Kommunistische Platform’ and the 
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‘Antikapitalistische Linke’ have benefitted from Die Linke’s organisational and financial strengths 
while pursuing an agenda or using methods sometimes in conflict with the party’s activities and 
policies moving within the parameters of parliamentarian democracy. While the links between non-
political party radical left and far-left parties – including those on the extreme and radical left24 – 
would be relevant to study also with regards to the reciprocal influence on discourses on immigration 
and identity, this article is limited to those actors on the radical left with no stake in electoral politics 
and therefore unfettered by such politics with regards to political instruments, and uncompromised in 
their values and objectives by party organisations or the requirements of parliamentary democracy. 
Lastly, the definition applied in this article could suggest that what is called ‘non-political party 
radical left’ is a united bloc. This is certainly not the case with regards to the how the radical left 
speaks of the means for building a different society – some groups may favour militancy and others 
insist on non-violent instruments – and vis-à-vis the very different expressions of the radical left’s 
‘prefigurative politics’25.   
This diversity is reflected in the cosmos of non-political party radical left organisations identified for 
this article. This cosmos is not static. Organisations often emerge when a political matter arises, and 
disappear again, or morph into a different shape when the situation allows or necessitates. Factions 
within the radical left emerge along often intense ideational fault lines and can create new 
organisational expressions. The German non-political party radical left is concentrated particularly in 
Berlin and Hamburg and in university towns. There seems to be a trend to further such concentration 
confirming, perhaps, the crisis of the radical left as it is also conveyed in the domestic intelligence 
service’s estimates of decreasing membership of the ‘extreme left’ – down to 26.700 from 31.800 in 
2011. However, in 2015 ‘militancy’ increased, according to the intelligence service.26 In this article, 
the texts produced by only a relatively small number of organisations and more fluid ideational groups 
were taken into account. Among these were the immigration policy focussed network ‘Kein Mensch 
ist Illegal’ (No-one is Illegal, founded 1997), the refugee-led ‘Caravan for the Rights of Refugees’ 
(founded 1998), a network of refugee activists called ‘The Voice’ (founded 1994), and the solidarity 
campaign ‘Lampedusa in Hamburg’ (founded 2013). Beyond those in the radical left exclusively 
focussed on refugees and asylum seekers, organisations such as ‘Für eine linke Strömung’ (For a Left 
Current, founded 1991) and its successor, the ‘Interventionistische Linke’ (founded 2005/2015), the 
autonomist-communist association ‘Ums Ganze’, (For the Whole, founded 2006), and a number of 
local anti-fascist groups are included in the analysis. Locally organised anti-gentrification movements 
– a significant topic for the radical left and often one which connects with the political mainstream – 
such as the Hamburg-based ‘Recht auf Stadt’ (Right to the City, founded 2009) are also discussed. A 
last example of a formal organisation is the ‘Kommunistischer Aufbau’ (Communist Platform, 
founded 2014) which espouses Leninist organisational principles. As the radical left does not always 
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appear in the form of organisations but also loose associations, the central publication of the ‘Anti-
Germans’, the ‘Bahamas’ magazine (founded 1992), was analysed, too, for its contributions to the 
discourse. 
To conclude, while there is demonstrable diversity within the non-political party radical left, and 
while there are overlaps between actors such as the ones in the focus of the article and political parties, 
the proposed definition of ‘radical left’ based on distinct ideology and long-term objectives to be 
achieved through non-parliamentarian means clearly demarcates a particular set of actors. In the 
remainder of the article, the shorthand term ‘radical left’ will be used to refer to the ‘non-polit ical 
party radical left’. 
 
Immigration, migrants and identity: three discourse types  
The remainder of the article seeks to address the research objectives outlined earlier. Focus is on the 
years between 2013 and 2016 as the refugee crisis in combination with terror attacks and the upsurge 
of far-right politics in its parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forms in Germany can be considered 
a qualitatively unique challenge (not only) to the country’s radical left. However, some recourse to 
the 1990s and 2000s will be made to explain the genesis of particular discourses.  
 
Discourse A: Instrumentalisation of refugees as ‘ersatz proletariat’  
The failure of ‘actually existing socialism’ in East Germany and the unification of West and East 
Germany in 1990 led to much soul-searching in Germany’s radical left. With communism and 
socialism discredited and the working class never further from assuming its historical role as 
revolutionary subject, intellectual circles and activists of the anti-racist, anti-
imperialist/internationalist, anti-capitalist and anti-fascist radical left started to debate their theoretical 
foundations and their praxis. Among the most pressing problems was the search for an ‘ersatz 
proletariat’, i.e. a historical subject in lieu of the working class. 
The analysis of publicly available texts shows that the refugee crisis was seen by some in the radical 
left as a window of opportunity to deal a blow to European capitalism, including the European Union 
itself, the Dublin II system and the Frontex border agency. In 2013, when refugee numbers had 
already been rising consistently, an author in the weekly left paper Jungle World celebrated that ‘these 
refugee struggles are transnational and cannot be controlled through any increasingly authoritarian 
migration checks’. The paper continued that  
 
the criticism of the European camp and deportation system is necessarily a criticism 
of globalised actually existing capitalism. The radical left has the unique opportunity 
to re-assert its project of universal liberation in this [refugee, the author] strugglei.27  
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The migrants themselves therefore are both instrument and subject in this struggle, led by a vanguard 
that had been waiting for the next opportunity to overturn capitalism. However, refugees should not 
count on the unconditional solidarity of the radical left, or on practical support to find a safe place in 
Germany. In February 2015, the Radikale Linke Berlin, a diverse organisation based in the anti-fascist 
movement and founded in 201428, indicated it would not join efforts to make life easier for refugees 
arriving in Germany or support refugees if this meant addressing the state with demands:  
 
Even if we want to participate in refugee protests and even if we support the various 
struggles and demands of those fleeing, as a group we will not send pleas, petitions 
or requests to the state. To call upon this system and this state is wrong. This state 
and this system are not addressees for pleas and calls. This state and this system must 
be rejected.ii  
 
Rather than supporting all refugees, the Radikale Linke wants to identify those among the refugees 
who want to join their struggle for a different society: in order to ‘end the madness of capitalism’ the 
group would ‘support the autonomous protests of the refugees and join in their struggle for a life in 
dignity and equality. We will support these struggles to the best of our abilities. […]. We will look 
for those who organise themselves and want to fight in order to establish another society’iii.29 Other 
voices from the autonomous and communist movement demanded, in December 2015, that the radical 
left should form a united front with refugees to combat the supposedly shared enemies. The alliance 
For the Whole called the flight of people from their countries of origin an ‘opportunity for a shared 
attempt at changing the present conditions’iv, and declared that the general fight of the radical left 
against Germany as an ‘authoritarian competition state’ should proceed alongside ‘attempts to tear 
holes into the border regime of selection and seclusion’30 in an effort that would result in more 
immigration into Germany of people with revolutionary potential.  
Voices from the non-party Communist-Leninist left demonstrated an even more instrumental view 
on the historical role of the refugee and immigrant in Germany and Europe. Overlooking what 
immigrants may wish for themselves or what kind of cultural or political identity or class background 
they may arrive with in Europe, the Communist Platform wrote that ‘the refugees and migrants in 
Germany are part of the working class. The refugee question, the strategy of the bourgeoisie vis-à-vis 
the refugees and the political resistance fight of the refugees and their supporters are therefore special 
forms of class war of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie’v.31  
This discourse type – of the ‘ersatz proletariat’ – existed already prior to the refugee crisis. For 
example, the organisers of an anti-racist border camp in 2002 wrote in their rationalisation of the 
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event that ‘our intention is to link the tactical demand for an improvement of the living conditions of 
refugees with a radical criticism of society’32. Such views were frequent even among groups which 
actively campaigned against legal restrictions to the free movement of refugees and asylum seekers 
in place at the time. In Germany, the so-called ‘Residenzpflicht’ legislation, which severely limited 
asylum seekers’ geographical mobility, was a strong campaign focus for the left in the late 1990s and 
galvanised action against the government. Groups which sought to bring German activists together 
with refugees – in order to move beyond the clientelistic model of ‘helping refugees’ – such as The 
Voice or The Caravan for the Rights of Refugees wanted to contribute to concrete policy change but 
usually connected this with radical demands and criticism. For example, The Voice, in 2007, 
denounced the German state by equating the Residenzpflicht to the ‘Israeli way of segregation and 
limitation of freedom of movement for Palestinians’vi.33 Furthermore, the group analysed the 
Residenzpflicht as leading to  
 
the isolation and the social exclusion of refugees. […] The Residenzpflicht negates any 
thought about integration. It is a continuation of the racist and fascist ideology which 
serves the interests of its adherents by excluding and criminalising certain social groups 
and presents them as ‘alien bodies’ and as in need of getting rid of34.viii  
 
While this proclamation took its departure from the criticism of concrete policy with the objective of 
improving refugees’ life in Germany, it also very clearly is about the radical left’s overall objective 
of radically changing ‘the system’, denounced as ‘fascist’ and ‘racist’. Moreover, groups such as the 
Voice or The Caravan have often discussed whether they should declare solidarity with refugees and 
the refugee movement when these do not share the aim of revolutionary transformation in Germany. 
In sum, this discourse type constitutes the immigrant and in particular the refugee as a revolutionary 
catalyst or instrument, conceding only limited autonomy to the immigrant or refugee as it constitutes 
them as subordinated to the autochthonous radical vanguard and its objectives. Questions of cultural 
or national identity are rarely touched upon in this discourse type as the immigrant is seen in terms 
of class. The immigrant or refugee is not constituted as an individual to be assisted with ‘integration’ 
in Germany if this implies negotiating and accommodation with ‘the state’. Arguably, the refugee 
crisis fuelled this discourse type as it gave a certain faction of the radical left a new rallying point for 
their political project under the impression of a large, albeit temporary, spike in immigration.  
 
Discourse B: No borders, no nations…but: pragmatic help for refugees and migrants 
A second discourse type puts the emphasis, first, on the responsibility of those in Germany’s radical 
left to practically help refugees and immigrants to come to Germany and to stay there and, second, 
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on the necessity to make vocal demands, in effective coalition with non-radical civil society actors, 
on the state to change policies considered discriminatory or as violations of human rights. These two 
aspects have created tensions and contradictions vis-à-vis the fundamental radical left principles 
endorsed by those actors understood here, in this article, to be producers of this second discourse 
type.  
This discourse type, again, existed before the refugee crisis. It was specifically the harmonisation of 
EU migration policies in the mid and late 1990s – coming to a first conclusive step with the 1999 
Treaty of Amsterdam – upon which resistance against what was perceived to be a highly restrictive 
border and immigration regime formed. Within the German context, the development of a 
coordinative network by existing and diverse anti-racist refugee and migrant solidarity organisations 
called ‘Kein Mensch ist illegal’ (No-one is Illegal, KMII) was the organisational expression of this 
resistance. Founded in 1997 at the ‘documenta X’ art exhibition, KMII was inspired by the French 
Sans Papiers35, associated with the international No Borders network, and brought together local 
groups from a broad range of political persuasions and backgrounds. In its 1997 manifesto, KMII 
formulated a central demand: ‘everybody has the right to decide where he wants to live and how. We 
reject borders which hinder people to decide where they live’ viii.36 While assuming a radical left 
position which denied the legitimacy of a central characteristic of the sovereign nation state, KMII 
and its constituent organisations invested most energy in day-to-day praxis to support immigrants and 
refugees survive in illegality or to help them ‘become legal’. These activities included giving advice 
on how to help migrants over the heavily guarded Schengen borders into Germany and the 
organisation of accommodation, school attendance and medical help for illegalised immigrants.37 In 
addition, groups organised in the KMII network also organised direct action to stop deportations38 
and took part in public campaigns to advocate for policy change. Even though much of KMII’s public 
political praxis was designed to draw in people from non-radical backgrounds39, in 1998 the domestic 
intelligence service categorised KMII as a ‘left wing extremist’ organisation40 – a judgement not 
repeated since. 
While the KMII network wanted to be praxis-oriented, it rejected the sovereign state and its 
legitimacy to decide who can live within its borders. Furthermore, organisations in the KMII network 
made no secret of their hopes that global migration would spell an end to the nation state. Guided by 
such radical left principles, under the impression of growing refugee numbers arriving on the Italian 
island of Lampedusa in 2008, and fifteen years after much-criticised restrictions to German asylum 
law came into force41, a group associated with KMII stated that they were fighting ‘for a global right 
to migration – for freedom of movement and de*fencing the nations’ix. But the tension between this 
radical demand and the rejection of capitalism as the main cause of mass migration to ‘Fortress 
Europe’ on the one hand, and the ‘pragmatic’ demand, led by the wish to help refugees stay in 
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Germany, that the German government revise legislation on the other hand, is palpable in this 
publication and elsewhere.42 Such tension also appeared in discussions about the ‘reformist’ demand 
to ‘legalise’ those without papers, seen by a minority as undermining the radical demand for the 
abolition of borders.43  
As a country-wide coordinating network, KMII is today history. However, ‘No-one is illegal’ survives 
as a frequently-used ‘brand’ by local groups committed to helping migrants live in Germany. This 
pragmatic discourse, sometimes coupled with radical but always subordinated principles, has been 
effective in more recent years. One example is ‘Lampedusa in Hamburg’. This became the name for 
a group of about 300 people who had escaped from Libya and arrived, via the Italian island of 
Lampedusa, in Hamburg in 2013. Threatened with their deportation to Italy according, the group 
organise public protests and petitions and occupied buildings with the aim to obtain the right to stay 
in Germany. While their campaign received support from a range of civil society actors, including the 
churches, support from the radical left was important and came from groups such as ‘The Caravan 
for the Rights of Refugees’, members of ‘ATESH – For a Social-revolutionary Perspective!’, the local 
anti-fascist and anti-racist movement,44 KMII Hamburg and an anti-gentrification alliance called 
‘Right to the City’ which, in 2015, demonstrated under the slogan ‘Right to the City – never mind the 
papers’.45 Similarly, in February 2016, The Caravan for the Rights of Refugees organised a protest in 
Munich for the right of refugees to stay in Germany while branding German legislation as ‘racist’. 
Simultaneously, it offered practical help to immigrants in cooperation with a diversity of civil society 
actors.46  
These and further examples demonstrate a discourse-as-social-practice which subordinates the radical 
left critique of the current political order to organising practical help to stay in Germany and to 
advocating policy change even if this means working with individuals and groups from elsewhere in 
civil society and accepting the state as an addressee for claims. However, those actors who 
discursively constitute the immigrant or refugee as an individual in need of support whilst 
emphasising that they are an autonomous subject find themselves in difficult waters as their radical 
left principles are in open contradiction to their day-to-day praxis. On the other hand, strict adherence 
to these principles would limit the ability to advocate for policy change or to negotiate with public 
officials with the aim to support, for example, individual refugees. The refugee crisis has led to a 
sharpening of these tensions whilst at the same time demonstrating the need for pragmatic help and 
continued policy activism towards a more open immigration system.  
 
Discourse C: Support immigrants to succeed in bourgeois society – because that’s what they want 
In the early 1990s, a small group of dissenters split from the West German non-parliamentary 
communist left. This association became known as the ‘anti-nationals’ or as the ‘Anti-Deutsche’, the 
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Anti-Germans,47 because it was German unification, the subsequent flourishing of national sentiment, 
and the waves of racist pogroms which gave some on the radical left an impetus to rethink the radical 
left project. The specific fear was that a united Germany would – again – pose a threat to ‘Western 
modernity’. In conjunction with a forceful criticism of the anti-imperialism/anti-colonialism and anti-
Zionism, anti-fascism, anti-racism and anti-capitalism of the ‘traditional’ German radical left, the 
Anti-Germans argued that the radical left should more critically discuss the themes of ‘nation’ and 
‘identity’. Some argue that the Anti-Germans’ critique was responsible for a ‘structural 
reconfiguration’ of the radical left.48 A later, but equally important juncture for the Anti-Germans 
were the terror attacks of ‘9/11’. Since then, the Anti-Germans, most vocally in their magazine 
‘Bahamas’, have argued that Islam’s anti-Western ideology chimed dangerously well with many in 
Germany’s left. Whilst maintaining that a communist revolution was desirable and should be actively 
sought, given its unlikely advent in the near future and given the threats posed both by Islam and the 
rise of ‘identity politics’ and nationalism, the Anti-Germans urged the radical left to defend the 
achievements of Western modernity – including the rule of law, civil liberties, and individual 
freedom49 – rather than fighting the fights of the 1960s and 1970s.  
In combination with their explicit support of Israel and their denunciation of anti-Semitism and anti-
Americanism elsewhere in the radical left, this stance has marginalised the Anti-Germans in the 
radical left. Not few consider the Anti-Germans to have their rightful place among reactionary forces 
and accuse them of ‘Islamophobia’50 and ‘racism’51 or call them a ‘plague’.52 Nonetheless, the Anti-
Germans consider themselves as a ‘corrective’ to the German radical left as one of their mottoes 
‘Against the left consensus!’x53 demonstrates, and continue to advocate the principles of communist 
society using Marx, Freudian psychology and Critical Theory as their intellectual foundations.  
How do the Anti-Germans discursively constitute the immigrant? During the refugee crisis, Anti-
Germans criticised that ‘asylum seekers have taken over the function, for the radical left, which once 
the proletariat had. Based on their origin they are seen as allies who will help them to get the 
revolutionary cart unstuck from the mud’xi.54 However, as Anti-Germans argued, the radical left 
should realise that migrants arriving in Europe want nothing but paid employment and a slice of 
Western life. They also may often have used their ‘elbows’, as illegally entering ‘Fortress Europe’ 
requires exactly those survival skills which are needed for successful competition on Europe’s labour 
markets.55 The Anti-Germans also mocked what they saw as the disappointment among the radical 
left when ‘the new arrivals do not want to play the noble savage but rather, as quickly as possible, 
want to enjoy the advantages of western lifestyles for which the European autochthonous today have 
nothing but contempt’.56   
The Anti-Germans implored the radical left to help refugees integrate into ‘the West’.57 In order to do 
so, the Anti-Germans called upon the radical left to stop projecting their own desires for a ‘cultural 
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identity’, unadultered by Western civilisation, on refugees and other immigrants. This would only 
lock them into their supposed identity communities and stop any attempt to emancipate as individua l. 
Already in 2005, authors in the Bahamas argued that rather than ‘representing people and their 
supposedly threatened identities’xiii58 the radical left should reject the anti-Western notion of ‘cultural 
authenticity’ and embrace immigrants as individuals. This demand was repeated during the refugee 
crisis, when Anti-Deutsche criticised those ‘among the friends of the welcome culture [the term 
popularly used to describe Germany’s initial response to the ‘refugee crisis’, the author] for whom 
everything which is not sheer enthusiasm for alien cultures passes as racism’xii59. 
Among the Anti-Germans, this stance on ‘identity’ and ‘culture’ gained prominence with the refugee 
crisis. But long before the crisis, the Anti-Germans had warned that more and more anti-Western 
communities were emerging around Islam in Europe. For the Anti-Germans, these communities are 
‘identity hells’ from which people should be rescued by offering them opportunities to assimilate into 
what they consider to be the most advanced human project, ‘the West’.60 In 2005, the Bahamas 
magazine referred to a 
 
café owner of Turkish descent […] who in 2003 remarked to the Tagesspiegel newspaper 
that he had not moved to Germany to find a mosque at every street corner like in Turkey. 
Those who really need mosques should have stayed in Turkey. But those migrants from 
Turkey who refuse to bow to the imposition to be a ‘Muslim’ qua origin, have no voice. 
These people, who speak German and Turkish but certainly not ‘kanak sprak’ [a term 
popularised by author Feridun Zaimoğlu to positively describe the sociolect of Turkish-
Germans, the author], those who claim the right for themselves to be normal […] are 
under increased surveillance: It could be that they are on the side of the adulators of 
western civilisationxvii.61  
 
However, the Anti-Germans already then were full of despair about those in the autochthonous radical 
left who were unwilling to help gain ‘normal people’ voice, an act which the Anti-Germans 
understood as a ‘civilising effort’62.  
In short, this discourse type constitutes immigrants and refugees as individuals coming to Europe 
with the desire to adopt ‘western attitudes and behaviours’xviii63 and, in the case of immigrants from 
predominantly Muslim countries, to become individuals safe from the ‘impositions of Islam’ xvi64. It 
calls upon the radical left to help these people65 to join ‘the West’ as a ‘project for the civilisation of 
the individual’xix 66 and not to abuse the immigrant as a political instrument. However, in particular 
already existing Muslim immigrant communities are represented as hostile to ‘the West’, and newly-
arriving refugees as in danger of being absorbed into these communities. For the Anti-Germans, the 
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refugee crisis has underlined some of the concerns which led to the creating of the Anti-Germans in 
the first place – the worry about the radical left’s disenchantment with Western modernity and the 
supposed threat of Islam to this modernity. The resulting demand to understand the refugee as 
someone to be helped towards assimilation distanced the Anti-Germans even further from others in 
the radical left, as did the Anti-Germans. 
 
Summary and conclusion  
The article presented an analysis of the discourse of Germany’s non-political party radical left with a 
focus on the moment when it was confronted with the refugee crisis whilst entering its third decade 
of continuous decline. This analysis was motivated by the understanding of crises as ‘open moments’ 
and catalysts for change. Therefore, the theoretical expectation underpinning this article was that the 
refugee crisis tested the radical left’s ways of thinking, speaking and acting on topics of high 
significance to its own political identity. Did then immigration generally, and immigration in the form 
of the refugee crisis of 2015 specifically, impact on the German radical left’s discourse on 
immigration and identity? 
The article presented evidence for the existence of three different discourse types within Germany’s 
radical left on these themes without assessing the strength of one discourse type over the other – 
future research could search for such tendencies within the radical left. Within the first type, immi-
grants, in particular refugees, were socially constituted as a much-needed ‘ersatz proletariat’ which 
can re-energise the radical left project. Faced with the refugee crisis, those producing this discourse 
constituted refugees as worthy of support only when they side with the radical left, thus confining the 
refugee to a subordinated position of power vis-à-vis the radical left. A second discourse type consti-
tuted immigrants as in need of support to stay in Germany and obliged the radical left to organise 
solidarity in the form of pragmatic help and political advocacy for and, crucially, with immigrants. In 
praxis, this has allowed immigrants to develop ‘voice’ and agency. Radical left stances on immigra-
tion, the state and borders were subordinated – albeit sometimes uneasily – to support and advocacy. 
A third discourse type, that of the Anti-Germans, was almost exclusively focussed on Muslim immi-
grants and constituted them in two main ways. On the one hand, the Anti-Germans saw their desirable 
assimilation into ‘the West’ under threat by an anti-imperialist, anti-racist and anti-capitalist radical 
left that feels nothing but contempt for Western modernity and therefore wishes to deny immigrants 
access to it. On the other hand, refugees and immigrants with a Muslim cultural identity, protected 
by a radical left which has come to project its own unrealisable desire for ‘cultural authenticity’ onto 
refugees and immigrants, are constituted as a threat to ‘the West’.  
Each of these discourses constitutes ‘the refugee’ or ‘the immigrant’ differently depending on the 
political identities and associated objectives within the radical left. While the ‘role of discourse in the 
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(re)production and challenge of dominance’67 was not central to the analysis presented here, the con-
sequences of the different discursive representations of immigrants were flagged up where possible. 
The aim was to show how some political actors, subscribed to a politics opposed to oppression and 
exploitation, have themselves discursively reproduced strict social hierarchies and have made politi-
cal and practical support conditional. Further analysis could try understand whether the different dis-
course types identified have had ‘real life consequences’ on immigrants, including the refugees ar-
riving in Germany during the refugee crisis.  
What could the consequences of the refugee crisis be on the radical left, generally speaking? It seems 
that the refugee crisis, earlier referred to as an ‘open moment’ and as a potential catalyst for change, 
has contributed to even more fragmentation and turbulence in the radical left’s ways of thinking, 
speaking and acting. In that sense, the crisis has been a challenge for a radical left already in decline 
and increasingly less able to organise in other than defensive and reactive ways.  
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